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Biafra: The Origin of Nigeria Civil War 1967 – 1970

Biafra: The Origin of Nigeria Civil War 1967 – 1970

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The Nigerian Civil War (Biafran War) started on 6 July 1967 – 15 January 1970. It was a war fought between the government of Nigeria and the secessionist state of Biafra. 

Biafra represented nationalist aspirations of the Igbo people, whose leadership felt they could no longer coexist with the Northern-dominated federal government.

The conflict resulted from political, economic, ethnic, cultural and religious tensions which preceded Britain’s formal decolonisation of Nigeria from 1960 to 1963. Immediate causes of the war in 1966 included a military coup, a
counter-coup, and persecution of Igbo living in Northern Nigeria. Control over oil
production in the Niger Delta played a vital strategic role.

Within a year, the Federal Military Government surrounded Biafra, capturing
coastal oil facilities and the city of Port Harcourt. The blockade imposed during the ensuing stalemate led to severe famine—accomplished deliberately as a war strategy. Over the two and half years of the war, there were about 100,000 overall military casualties, while between 500,000 and 2 million Biafran civilians died from starvation.

This famine entered world awareness in mid-1968, when images of malnourished and starving children suddenly saturated the mass media of Western countries. The plight of the starving Biafrans became a cause célèbre in foreign countries, enabling a significant rise in the funding and prominence of international non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Britain and the Soviet Union were the main supporters of the Nigerian government in Lagos, while France, Israel and some other countries supported Biafra. However, France and Israel provided weapons to both combatants.

Ethnic division

The civil war can be linked back to the 1914 amalgamation of Northern and southern Nigeria, which was for the purpose of better administration due to close proximity.

However, there was so much difference in the culture and religion of the
people. After the amalgamation, oil was discovered in Eastern Nigeria (now
South South Nigeria), and this was a turning point in the history of Nigeria,
as that led to the struggle for control amongst the regions. At this point,
there was a power tussle to see who could control the central power and with
southern Nigeria not as united as the north, it was arguably disadvantaged. In
July 1966 Northern officers staged a counter-coup to revenge on the easterners
which saw Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon emerge as the head of state. During his tenure
killing of Easters in the north continued and this led to several actions which
eventually resulted in the Biafran war.

Nigeria, which gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1960,
had at that time a population of 60 million people consisting of more than 300
differing ethnic and cultural groups. More than fifty years earlier, the United
Kingdom had carved an area out of West Africa containing hundreds of different
ethnic groups and unified it, calling it Nigeria. Although the area contained
many different groups, the three predominant groups were the Igbo, which
formed between 60–70% of the population in the southeast; the Hausa-Fulani, which formed about 65% of the peoples in the northern part of the territory; and the Yoruba, which formed about 75% of the population in the southwestern part. Although these groups have their own homelands, by the 1960s they were dispersed across Nigeria, with all three ethnic groups represented substantially in major cities. When the war broke out in 1967 there were still 5,000 Igbos in Lagos.

The semi-feudal and Islamic Hausa-Fulani in the North were traditionally ruled by a feudal, conservative Islamic hierarchy consisting of Emirs who, in turn, owed their allegiance to a supreme Sultan. This Sultan was regarded as the source of all political power and religious authority.

The Yoruba political system in the southwest, like that of the Hausa-Fulani, also consisted of a series of monarchs, the Oba. The Yoruba monarchs, however, were less autocratic than those in the North, and the political and social system of the Yoruba accordingly allowed for greater upward mobility based on acquired rather than inherited wealth and title.

The Igbo in the southeast, in contrast to the two other groups, lived mostly in autonomous, democratically organised communities, although there were
monarchs in many of these ancient cities such as the Kingdom of Nri. In its
zenith the Kingdom controlled most of Igbo land, including influence on the Anioma people, Arochukwu (which controlled slavery in Igbo), and Onitsha land.
Unlike the other two regions, decisions among the Igbo were made by a general
assembly in which men could participate.

The differing political systems among these three peoples reflected and
produced divergent customs and values. The Hausa-Fulani commoners, having
contact with the political system only through a village head designated by the
Emir or one of his subordinates, did not view political leaders as amenable to
influence. Political decisions were to be submitted to. As with all other authoritarian and liberal religious and political systems, leadership positions were given to persons willing to be subservient and loyal to superiors. A chief function of this political system in this context was to maintain conservative values, which caused many Hausa-Fulani to view economic and social innovation as subversive or sacrilegious.

In contrast to the Hausa-Fulani, the Igbo often participate directly in the
decisions which affected their lives. They had a lively awareness of the political
system and regarded it as an instrument for achieving their own personal goals.
Status was acquired through the ability to arbitrate disputes that might arise
in the village, and through acquiring rather than inheriting wealth. Igbos were
substantially victimised in the Atlantic slave trade; in the year 1790 it was
reported that of 20,000 people sold each year from Bonny, 16,000
were Igbo. With their emphasis upon social achievement and political
participation, the Igbo adapted to and challenged colonial rule in innovative
ways.

These tradition-derived differences were perpetuated and perhaps even
enhanced by the British system of colonial rule in Nigeria. In the North, the British
found it convenient to rule indirectly through the Emirs, thus perpetuating rather than changing the indigenous authoritarian political system. As a concomitant of this system, Christian missionaries were excluded from the North, and the area thus remained virtually closed to European cultural imperialism, in contrast to the Igbo, the richest of whom sent many of their sons to British universities. During the ensuing years, the Northern Emirs thus were able to maintain traditional political and religious institutions, while reinforcing their social structure. In this
division, the North, at the time of independence in 1960, was by far the most
underdeveloped area in Nigeria, with an English literacy rate of 2% as compared
to 19.2% in the East (literacy in Ajami (local languages in Arabic script),
learned in connection with religious education, was much higher). The West
enjoyed a much higher literacy level, being the first part of the country to
have contact with western education in addition to the free primary education
program of the pre-independence Western Regional Government.

In the South, the missionaries rapidly introduced Western forms of education. Consequently, the Yoruba were the first group in Nigeria to adopt Western bureaucratic social norms and they provided the first African civil servants, doctors, lawyers, and other technicians and professionals.

In Igbo areas, missionaries were introduced at a later date because of
British difficulty in establishing firm control over the highly autonomous Igbo communities. However, the Igbo people took to Western education actively, and they overwhelmingly came to adopt Christianity. Population pressure in the Igbo homeland combined with aspirations for monetary wages drove thousands of Igbo’s to other parts of Nigeria in search of work. By the 1960s, Igbo political culture was more unified and the region relatively prosperous, with tradesmen and literate elites active not just in the traditionally Igbo South, but throughout Nigeria.

Politics and economics of federalism

The British colonial ideology that divided Nigeria into three regions—North, West and East—exacerbated the already well-developed economic, political, and social differences among Nigeria’s different ethnic groups. The country was divided in such a way that the North had a slightly higher population than the other two regions combined. On this basis the Northern Region was allocated a majority of the seats in the Federal Legislature established by the colonial authorities. Within each of the three regions the dominant ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo, respectively formed political parties that were largely regional and based on ethnic allegiances:

The Northern
People’s Congress (NPC) in the North; the Action Group in the West (AG); and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) in the East. These parties were not exclusively homogeneous in terms of their ethnic or regional make-up; the disintegration of Nigeria resulted largely from the fact that these parties were primarily based in one region and one tribe. To simplify matters, we will refer to them here as the Hausa, Yoruba, and Ibo-based; or Northern, Western and Eastern parties.

Northern–Southern tension manifested on 1 May 1953, as fighting in the Northern city of Kano. The political parties tended to focus on building power in their own
regions, resulting in an incoherent and disunified dynamic in the federal
government.

In 1946, the British divided the Southern Region into the Western
Region and the Eastern
Region. Each government was entitled to collect
royalties from resources extracted within its area. This changed in 1956 when
Shell-BP found large petroleum deposits in the Eastern region. A Commission led
by Jeremy Raisman and Ronald Tress determined
that resource royalties would now enter a “Distributable Pools
Account” with the money split between different parts of government (50%
to region of origin, 20% to federal government, 30% to other regions). To
ensure continuing influence, the British promoted unity in the Northern bloc
and discord among and within the two Southern regions, as well as the creation
of a new Mid-Western
Region in an area with oil potential. The new
constitution of 1946 also proclaimed that “The entire property in and
control of all mineral oils, in, under, or upon any lands, in Nigeria, and of
all rivers, streams, and watercourses throughout Nigeria, is and shall be
vested in, the Crown.” Britain profited significantly from a fivefold rise
in Nigerian exports amidst the postwar economic boom.

First Republic

Nigeria’s First Republic came into being on 1 October 1960. The first prime minister of Nigeria, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, was a northerner and co-founder of the Northern People’s Congress. He formed an alliance with the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons party, and its popular nationalist leader Nnamdi “Zik” Azikiwe, who became Governor General and then President. The Yoruba-aligned Action Group, the third major party, played the opposition role.

Workers became increasingly aggrieved by low wages and bad conditions,
especially when they compared their lot to the lifestyles of politicians in
Lagos. Most wage earners lived in the Lagos area, and many lived in overcrowded
dangerous housing. Labor activity including strikes intensified in 1963,
culminating in a nationwide general strike in June 1964. Strikers disobeyed an
ultimatum to return to work and at one point were dispersed by riot police.
Eventually, they did win wage increases. The strike included people from all
ethnic groups. Retired Brigadier General H. M. Njoku later wrote that the
general strike heavily exacerbated tensions between the Army and ordinary
civilians, and put pressure on the Army to take action against a government
which was widely perceived as corrupt.

The 1964 elections, which involved heavy campaigning all year, brought ethnic and regional divisions into focus. Resentment of politicians ran high and many campaigners feared for their safety while touring the country. The Army repeatedly deployed to Tiv Division, killing hundreds and arresting thousands of Tiv people agitating for self-determination.

Widespread reports of fraud tarnished the election’s legitimacy. Westerners
especially resented the political domination of the Northern People’s Congress,
many of whose candidates ran unopposed in the election. Violence spread
throughout the country and some began to flee the North and West, some to Dahomey. The apparent domination of the political system by the North, and the chaos breaking out across the country, motivated elements within the military to
consider decisive action.

War

Shortly after extending its blockade to include oil, the Nigerian
government launched a “police action” to
retake the secessionist territory. The war began on the early hours of 6 July
1967 when Nigerian Federal troops advanced in two columns into Biafra. The
Biafra strategy had succeeded. The federal government had started the war, and
the East was one defending itself. 

The Nigerian Army offensive
was through the north of Biafra led by Colonel Mohammed Shuwa and the
local military units were formed as the 1st Infantry
Division. The division was led mostly by northern
officers. After facing unexpectedly fierce resistance and high casualties, the
right-hand Nigerian column advanced on the town of Nsukka which fell on 14 July, while
the left-hand column made for Garkem, which was captured on 12 July.

Atrocities against Ethnic
Minorities in Biafra

Minorities in Biafra suffered atrocities at the hands of those fighting for
both sides of the conflict. The pogroms in the North in 1966 were
indiscriminately directed against people from Eastern Nigeria.

Despite a seemingly natural alliance between these victims of the pogroms
in the north, tensions rose as minorities, who had always harbored an interest
in having their own state within the Nigerian federation, were suspected of
collaborating with Federal troops to undermine Biafra.

The Federal troops were equally culpable of this crime. In the Rivers area,
ethnic minorities sympathetic to Biafra were killed in the hundreds by federal
troops. In Calabar, some 2000 Efiks were also killed by Federal troops. Outside
of the Biafra, atrocities were recorded against the resident of Asaba in
present-day Delta State by both sides of the conflict.

International involvement

Britain

The British planned to maintain and expand their supply of cheap
high-quality oil from Nigeria. Therefore they placed a high priority on
maintenance of oil extraction and refining operations. They backed the Federal
Government, but when the war broke out cautioned them not to damage British oil
installations in the East. 

These oilworks, under the control of Shell-BP
Petroleum Development Company (jointly owned by Shell and British Petroleum),
controlled 84% of Nigeria’s 580,000 barrels per day. Two-thirds of this oil
came from the Eastern region, and another third from the newly created Mid-West
region. Two-fifths of all Nigerian oil ended up in Britain.

Shell-BP therefore considered carefully a request by the Federal Government
that it not pay the royalties demanded by Biafra. Its lawyers advised
that payment to Biafra would be appropriate if this government did in fact
maintain law and order in the region in question. The British government
advised that paying Biafra could undermine the goodwill of the Federal
Government. However, the payment was made, resulting in a blockade on oil.
Forced to choose a side, Shell-BP and the British government threw in their lot
with the Federal Government in Lagos, apparently calculating that this side
would be more likely to win the war. As the British High Commissioner in Lagos
wrote to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs on 27 July 1967:

Ojukwu, even victorious, will not be in a strong position. He will require
all the international help and recognition he can get. The Federal Government
would be much better placed both internationally and internally. They would
have a cast iron case for the severest treatment of a company which has
subsidised a rebel, and I feel fairly convinced they would press their case to
the lengths of cancelling the Company’s concessions and nationalising their
installations. I conclude, therefore, if the company does change its mind and
asks the British Government for advice, the best that could be given is for it
to clamber hastily back on the Lagos side of the fence with cheque book at the
ready.”

Shell-BP took this advice. It continued to quietly support Nigeria through
the rest of the war, in one case advancing a royalty of £5.5 million to fund
the purchase of more British weapons.

During the war, Britain covertly supplied Nigeria with weapons and military
intelligence and may have also helped it to hire mercenaries. After the
decision was made to back Nigeria, the BBC oriented its reporting to favor this
side. Supplies provided to the Federal Military Government included two vessels
and 60 vehicles.

In Britain, the humanitarian campaign around Biafra began on 12 June 1968,
with media coverage on ITV and in The Sun. The charities Oxfam and Save the
Children Fund were soon deployed, with
large sums of money at their disposal.

France

France provided weapons, mercenary fighters, and other assistance to Biafra
and promoted its cause internationally, describing the situation as a genocide.
Charles de Gaulle referred to “Biafra’s just and noble cause”. However, France did
not recognise Biafra diplomatically. Through Pierre Laureys, France had
apparently provided two B-26s, Alouette helicopters, and pilots. 

France
supplied Biafra with captured German and Italian weapons from World War II,
sans serial numbers, delivered as part of regular shipments to Côte d’Ivoire. France
also sold Panhard armored
vehicles to the Nigerian federal government.

French involvement in the war can be viewed in the context of its
geopolitical strategy (Françafrique) and competition
with the English in West Africa. Nigeria represented a base of British
influence in the predominantly French-aligned area. France and Portugal used
nearby countries in their sphere of influence, especially Côte d’Ivoire under
President Félix
Houphouët-Boigny, as waystations for shipments
to Biafra. To some extent, also, France repeated its earlier policy from the Congo Crisis, when it
supported the secession of the southern mining province Katanga.

Economically, France was significantly incentivised by oil drilling
contracts for the Société Anonyme Française de Recherches et d’Exploitation
de Pétrolières (SAFRAP), apparently arranged with Eastern Nigeria in
advance of its secession from the Nigerian Federation. SAFRAP laid claim to 7%
of the Nigerian petroleum supply. In the assessment of a CIA analyst in 1970,
France’s “support was actually given to a handful of Biafran bourgeoisie
in return for the oil.” Biafra, for its part, openly appreciated its
relationship with France. Ojukwu suggested on 10 August 1967, that Biafra
introduce compulsory French classes in secondary, technical and teacher
training schools, in order to “benefit from the rich culture of the
French-speaking world”.

France led the way, internationally, for political support of Biafra. Portugal also sent
weapons. These transactions were arranged through the “Biafran Historical
Research Centre” in Paris. French-aligned Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire recognised
Biafra in May 1968. On 8 May 1968, De Gaulle personally contributed 30,000
francs to medicine purchases for the French Red Cross mission. Fairly
widespread student-worker unrest diverted the government’s attention only temporarily. The government declared an arms embargo but maintained arms shipments to Biafra under cover of humanitarian aid. In July the government redoubled its efforts to involve the public in a humanitarian approach to the conflict. Images of starving children and accusations of genocide filled French newspapers and television programs.

Amidst this press blitz, on 31 July 1968, De Gaulle made an official statement
in support of Biafra. Maurice Robert, head of Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage (SDECE, the French foreign intelligence service) African operations, wrote in 2004 that his agency supplied the press with details about the war and told them to use the word “genocide” in their reporting.

France declared “Biafra Week” on 11–17 March 1969, centred on a
2-franc raffle held by the French Red Cross. Soon after, de Gaulle terminated
arms shipments, then resigned on 27 April 1969. Interim president Alain Poher fired
General Jacques Foccart, the lead coordinator of France’s Africa policy. Georges Pompidou re-hired
Foccart and resumed support for Biafra, including cooperation with the South
African secret service to import more weapons.

United States of America

The United States officially declared neutrality, with US Secretary of State Dean Rusk stating that “America is not in a position to take action as Nigeria is an area under British influence.”, Formally, the United States was neutral in the civil war. Strategically, its interests aligned with the Federal Military Government. The US also saw value in its alliance with Lagos, and sought to protect $800 million (in the assessment of the State Department) worth of private investment.

On 9 September 1968, United States presidential candidate Richard Nixon stated:

Until now, efforts to relieve the Biafra people have been thwarted by the
desire of central government of Nigeria to pursue total and unconditional
victory and by the fear of the Ibo people that surrender means wholesale
atrocities and genocide. But genocide is what is taking place right now – and
starvation is the grim reaper.

When Nixon became President in 1969, he found there was little he could do
to change the established stance aside from call for another round of peace
talks. Despite this, he continued to personally support Biafra.

Gulf Oil Nigeria,
the third major player in Nigerian oil, was producing 9% of the oil coming out
of Nigeria before the war began. Its operations were all located offshore of
the federally controlled Mid-Western territory; therefore it continued to pay
royalties to the federal government and its operations were mostly undisrupted.

Soviet Union

The Soviet Union strongly backed the Nigerian government, emphasising the similarity with the Congo situation. It consistently supplied Nigeria with weapons, with the diplomatic disclaimer that these were “strictly for cash on a commercial basis”.

In 1968, the USSR agreed to finance the Kainji Dam on the Niger (somewhat upriver from the Delta). Soviet media outlets initially accused the imperialist British of cynically supporting the Biafran secession, then had to adjust these claims later when it turned out that Britain was in fact supporting the Federal Government.

One explanation for Soviet sympathy with the Federal Military Government
was a shared opposition to internal secessionist movements. Before the war, the
Soviets had seemed sympathetic to the Igbos. But Soviet Prime Minister Alexei
Kosygin stated to their chagrin in October 1967 that “the Soviet people
fully understand” Nigeria’s motives and its need “to prevent the
country from being dismembered.”

Reportedly, the war substantially improved Soviet-Nigerian diplomatic and
trade relations, and Moskvitch cars began to make appearances around Lagos. The USSR became a competitive importer of Nigerian cacao.

Israel

From early on, Israel perceived that Nigeria would be an important player
in West African politics, and saw good relations with Lagos as an important
foreign policy objective. Nigeria and Israel established a linkage in 1957. In
1960 Britain allowed the creation of an Israeli diplomatic mission in Lagos,
and Israel made a $10 million loan to the Nigerian government. Israel also
developed a cultural relation with the Igbos based on possible shared
traditions.

These moves represented a significant diplomatic success given the Muslim orientation of the northern-dominated government. Some northern leaders
disapproved of contact with Israel and banned Israelis from Maiduguri and Sokoto.

Israel did not begin arms sales to Nigeria until after Aguyi-Ironsi came to
power in January 1966. This was considered an opportune time to develop this
relationship with the federal government. Ram Nirgad became Israeli ambassador
to Nigeria in January. Thirty tons of mortar rounds were delivered in April.

The Eastern Region began seeking assistance from Israel in September 1966.
Israel apparently turned down their requests repeatedly, although they may have
put the Biafran representatives in contact with another arms dealer. In 1968,
Israel began supplying the Federal Military Government with arms—about $500,000 worth, according to the US State Department. Meanwhile, as elsewhere, the situation in Biafra became publicised as a genocide.

The Knesset publicly debated this issue on 17 and 22 July 1968, winning applause from the press for its sensitivity. Right-wing and left-wing political groups, and student activists, spoke for Biafra. In August 1968, the Israeli air force overtly sent
twelve tons of food aid to a nearby site outside of Nigerian (Biafran) air space.
Covertly, Mossad provided Biafra with $100,000 (through Zurich) and attempted
an arms shipment. Soon after, Israel arranged to make clandestine weapons
shipments to Biafra using Côte d’Ivoire transport planes.

End of the war

With increased British support, the Nigerian federal forces launched their
final offensive against the Biafrans once again on 23 December 1969, with a
major thrust by the 3rd Marine Commando Division. The division was commanded by Col. Olusegun Obasanjo, which succeeded in splitting the Biafran enclave into two by the end of the year. The final Nigerian offensive, named “Operation Tail-Wind”, was launched on 7 January 1970 with the 3rd Marine Commando Division attacking, and supported by the 1st Infantry division to the north and the 2nd Infantry division to the south. 

The Biafran towns of Owerri fell on 9 January, and Uli on 11 January. Only a few days earlier, Ojukwu fled into exile by plane to the Ivory Coast, leaving his deputy Philip Effiong to handle the details of the surrender to General Yakubu Gowon of the Federal Army on 13 January 1970. The surrender paper was signed on 14 January 1970 in Lagos and thus came the end of the civil war and renunciation of
secession. The war finally ended a few days later, with the Nigerian forces
advancing into the remaining Biafran-held territories, which was met with
little resistance.

After the war, Gowon said, “The tragic chapter of violence is just
ended. We are at the dawn of national reconciliation. Once again we have an
opportunity to build a new nation. My dear compatriots, we must pay homage to
the fallen, to the heroes who have made the supreme sacrifice that we may be
able to build a nation, great in justice, fair trade, and industry.”

Reconstruction

Reconstruction, helped by the oil money, was swift; however, the old ethnic
and religious tensions remained a constant feature of Nigerian politics.
Accusations were made of Nigerian government officials diverting resources
meant for reconstruction in the former Biafran areas to their ethnic areas.
Military government continued in power in Nigeria for many years, and people in
the oil-producing areas claimed they were being denied a fair share of oil
revenues. Laws were passed mandating that political parties could not be
ethnically or tribally based; however, it has been hard to make this work in
practice.

Igbos who ran for their lives during the pogroms and war returned to find
their positions had been taken over; and when the war was over the government
did not feel any need to re-instate them, preferring to regard them as having
resigned. 

This reasoning was also extended to Igbo-owned properties and houses.
People from other regions were quick to take over any house owned by an Igbo,
especially in the Port Harcourt area. The Nigerian Government justified this by
terming such properties abandoned. This, however, has led to a feeling of an
injustice as the Nigerian government policies were seen as further economically
disabling the Igbos even long after the war. 

Further feelings of injustice were caused by Nigeria changing its currency, so that Biafran supplies of pre-war Nigerian currency were no longer honoured. At the end of the war, only N£20 was given to any easterner regardless of the amount of money he or she had had in the bank. This was applied irrespective of their banking in pre-war Nigerian currency or Biafran currency. This was seen as a deliberate policy to hold back the Igbo middle class, leaving them with little wealth to expand their business interests.

Fall of Biafra

On 29 May 2000, The Guardian reported that President Olusegun Obasanjo commuted to retirement the dismissal of all military persons who fought for the breakaway state of Biafra during the Nigerian civil war. In a national broadcast, he said that the decision was based on the principle that “justice must at all times be tempered with mercy.”

Biafra was more or less wiped off the map until its resurrection by the
contemporary Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State
of Biafra. Chinua Achebe’s last book, There Was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra, has also rekindled discussion of the war.

Credit: Wikipedia

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